Moral theories that demand that we do what is morally best leave no room for the supererogatory. One argument against such theories is that they fail to realize the value of autonomy: supererogatory acts allow for the exercise of autonomy because their omissions are not accompanied by any threats of sanctions, unlike obligatory ones. While this argument fails, I use the distinction it draws – between omissions of obligatory and supererogatory acts in terms of appropriate sanctions – to draw a (...) parallel with psychological perfectionism. Through this parallel, I demonstrate that requiring what is morally best is in fact counter-productive. Thus, by its own lights, a theory that wants us to do what is best ought at the very least to tell us to believe that some actions are supererogatory. As the old adage goes, the best is the enemy of the good; I argue here that the supererogatory is the solution. (shrink)

L’admiration de Paul Ricoeur pour Merleau-Ponty est connue, lui qui entendait donner à la Phénoménologie de la perception sa « contrepartie pratique » avec le premier tome de la Philosophie de la volonté, Le Volontaire et l’involontaire. Il faut d’emblée s’étonner que celui-ci n’ait pas reconnu la teneur pratique de la philosophie de son aîné, dont les diverses analyses au Collège de France, et en particulier l’intérêt marqué de Merleau-Ponty pour la pensée marxiste comme philosophie de l’homme charnel, et le (...) motif naturaliste de l’être agissant et souffrant à partir de 1956, font état. Car c’est bien depuis ce motif que Ricoeur, en 2004, expose le parcours de la reconnaissance : de l’homme agissant et souffrant, à l’homme capable. L’enjeu, nous semble-t-il alors, de ces deux philosophies en leur dimension pratique se résume aisément par les exigences formulées par Paul Ricoeur dans l’ouvrage Soi-même comme un autre, en particulier lorsque celui-ci se donne pour but de « déterminer les traits nouveaux de l’ipséité correspondant à la pratique politique » – détermination du Soi agent qui se dessine, au dire même de l’auteur, à la croisée d’une phénoménologie de l’agir et d’une ontologie du Soi. En effet, comme le souligne Ricoeur, l’effacement paradoxal de la question de l’ipséité dans la philosophie morale kantienne, entre autres, s’explique par l’absence d’une telle théorie de l’action. En bref, le « Je veux » analysé en 1950 par Ricoeur s’ancre dans un « Je peux », qui ne se limite jamais au seul plan spatial chez Merleau-Ponty. Ainsi, à la figure phénoménologique de nos expériences de la passivité correspond la catégorie ontologique de l’altérité, mentionnée par l’expression du Visible et de l’invisible reprise en titre de cet article et dont l’attribution à Ricoeur ne choquerait pas.Paul Ricoeur’s admiration for Merleau-Ponty is well-known given that he presented his “practical counterpart” to the Phenomenology of Perception in the form of his Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. One is immediately surprised that this is not recognized as the practical content of his predecessor’s philosophy given the diverse analyses at the Collège de France of which, in particular, the marked interest Merleau-Ponty had in Marxist thought as the philosophy of the fleshly human being, as well as the naturalist motif of the active and suffering being beginning in 1956, are part. For, it is due to this motif that Ricoeur, in 2004, presents the trajectory of recognition: from the active and suffering human being to the capable human being. As we see them, the stakes in these two philosophies, as far as their practical dimensions are concerned, are easily summarized by the requirements Paul Ricoeur formulated in his work, Oneself as Another. This is particularly the case given that this text has for its aim, “determining the new traits of individual identity which correspond to practical politics” – the determination of Self as a self-designing agent, which, according to the author, lies at the intersection of a phenomenology of action and an ontology of the Self. In fact, as Ricoeur himself underlines, the paradoxical effacement of the question of ipseity in Kantian moral philosophy, among others, is explained by the absence of just such a theory of action. Briefly, the “I want” analysis by Ricoeur in 1950 is anchored in the “I can,” which is never limited to the single spatial outline we find in Merleau-Ponty. Thus, to the phenomenological figure of our experiences of passivity correspond the ontological category of alterity, as mentioned in the phrase from The Visible and the Invisible taken up in the title of this article and which it would not be shocking to attribute to Ricoeur.È ben nota l’ammirazione di Paul Ricoeur per Merleau-Ponty: col primo tomo della Philosophie de la volonté, intitolato Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, Paul Ricoeur intendeva offrire alla Fenomenologia della percezione una vera e propria “contropartita pratica”. Ma è singolare il fatto che Ricoeur non abbia riconosciuto il risvolto pratico presente nella filosofia del suo predecessore, risvolto ampiamente attestato nei corsi merleau-pontyani al Collège de France e in particolare nelle lezioni che pongono al centro delle loro analisi il pensiero marxista come filosofia dell’uomo carnale e il motivo naturalistico dell’uomo agente e dell’uomo sofferente almeno a partire dal 1956. È proprio prendendo le mosse da questo motivo che Ricoeur nel 2004 espone quanto definisce come il percorso del riconoscimento: dall’uomo agente e dall’uomo sofferente all’uomo “capace”. La posta in gioco, ci sembra, di queste due filosofie, considerate nella loro dimensione pratica, si riassume facilmente nelle esigenze che Ricoeur formula nel suo libro Sé come un altro, in particolare quando si assegna il compito di “determinare i tratti peculiari dell’ipseità corrispondente alla pratica politica” – cioè di determinare i tratti di quel Sé agente che si delinea, a dire dell’autore stesso, al crocevia tra una fenomenologia dell’agire e un’ontologia del Sé. In effetti, come sottolinea Ricoeur, la paradossale cancellazione dell’ipseità operata dalla filosofia morale kantiana si spiega tra l’altro con l’assenza di una adeguata teoria dell’azione. In breve, l’“Io voglio” analizzato da Ricoeur nel 1950 si àncora in un “Io posso” che non si limita mai, in Merleau-Ponty, al solo piano spaziale. Così, alla figura fenomenologica delle nostre esperienze di passività, corrisponde la categoria ontologica dell’alterità, che proprio Il visibile e l’invisibile menziona con l’espressione che noi riprendiamo nel titolo di questo articolo e che ci si aspetterebbe essere anzitutto ricoeuriana. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How I Hate You, CancerClaire YarMigraine. That’s what we thought. They run in my family, so why not? My beautiful, bright, extroverted ten–year–old daughter’s neurological exam was unremarkable, but she had a bad headache and was vomiting in the early morning hours. Migraine didn’t seem that much of a stretch. Our savvy pediatrician had a gut feeling that it was more than a migraine and sent her for an (...) MRI.We had not even left the children’s hospital before I received a voicemail to call our pediatrician. When I returned the call, on our way to pick up Ellie’s younger brother from school and already running late I heard the words that no parent wants to hear, “I have bad news. We found a brain tumor and it’s rather large”. This conversation would turn our lives into a frenzy of fear and leave unanswered (unanswerable?) questions. I was told to bring her to the ER where we would be met by a neurosurgeon and oncologist. I could not process this information. My initial fears were too scary to utter. Was she going to die? Do children survive brain surgery “intact”? Is it operable? Oncologist = scary cancer, doesn’t it? Did we do something to cause it? What if our insurance doesn’t cover the best treatment?Clinging to the life I knew before—needing to stay in the “before,” not even pulling the car over, I reached backwards, held Ellie’s leg and spoke the words out loud for the first time. That’s what a brain tumor diagnosis does to your family. It breaks up time into “before” and “after”. Her reaction was a terrified wail and then, oddly, hysterical laughter. Is that what shock looks like? My own reaction to the call was of stunned silence. The sound of my heartbeat and the blood rushing in my ears meant I could not ask the questions I had in that moment.Ellie has always been exceptional. She is a bright light in any room. At only ten–years–old, she spoke like a teenager; had the vocabulary of an adult. Never again would I be able to take this for granted. In every waking moment that our lives were unoccupied with the practicalities of a brain tumor diagnosis, the questions I couldn’t think of or say out loud during that terrible phone call continually flooded my thoughts. Your child’s brain is everything after all; it’s what makes them “them.”An avid horse rider, she had been off her favorite horse’s back for a few weeks saying that the bouncing hurt her neck. I had kept her off school for several days, but we had seen marked improvement in [End Page E12] the day or two leading up to that devastating D–Day of diagnosis, and she had been back at school doing well. Only a week before, Ellie had been dancing at a party with friends. How could she have a brain tumor?We rushed home and hurriedly packed our bags for “at least a week”—and I recall that life seemed to be both in slow motion and traveling at the speed of light. I desperately wanted to turn the clock back to the innocence we had known a few hours before. This was way too much news to hear in one day. Even when I heard the diagnosis, I was surprised that we would have to go to the hospital that day. Now! Don’t people get time to process or plan and get second opinions? We had no time to tell family and friends or ask for help. We didn’t have the luxury of time. Time is another thing I no longer take for granted.Upon arrival at the large children’s hospital we felt as if we were given so much information, but looking back, I now know that these angels are trained in giving parents only what they can handle—in tiny pieces, nibble by nibble. You don’t (can’t) hear half of it anyway. Our families live far from us, and trying to gather and figure out... (shrink)

In this new translation the brilliant and impassioned descriptions of Augustine's colourful early life are conveyed to the English reader with accuracy and art. Augustine tells of his wrestlings to master his sexual drive, his rare ascent from a humble Algerian farm to the edge of the corridors of high power at the imperial court of Milan, and his renunciation of secular ambition and marriage as he recovered the faith that his mother had taught him. It was in a Milan (...) garden that Augustine finally achieved the act of will to Christian conversion, which he compared to a lazy man in bed finally deciding it is time to get up and face the day. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

"Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), philosophe, théologien et scientifique français, a joui d'une influence considérable, avant que la distance entre la philosophie et la spiritualité chrétienne ne se creuse. Marquée par la double leçon de saint Augustin et de Descartes, son oeuvre vise à concilier foi et raison, à articuler Providence divine, mécanisme naturel et liberté humaine. Cet effort de synthèse donne naissance à une métaphysique audacieuse : elle affirme un " occasionnalisme " intégral (les actions des créatures ne sont que (...) l'" occasion " de l'agir divin), conçoit " l'étendue intelligible " comme la matrice des idées des corps et fonde les vérités théoriques et pratiques sur une " vision en Dieu " dont la singularité étonne et prête à malentendu. Aussi la pensée de Malebranche occupe-t-elle une place remarquable dans l'histoire des idées. L'antipsychologisme de sa théorie de la signification, sa déconstruction de la notion de cause finie au profit du schème de la loi, sa mise en question de la conscience comme mode de connaissance sont des thèses que la modernité a su s'approprier. Ce sont elles qui font l'actualité de cette philosophie, par-delà le cartésianisme christianisé auquel on a parfois voulu la réduire."--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Sommes-nous tous malades? La médecine, ses approches de l'humain, son vocabulaire ont pénétré dans notre univers quotidien. Une telle médicalisation de notre existence n'est pas sans effet. Les problèmes du corps et de l'âme se voient systématiquement redéfinis en pathologies et les différentes phases de la vie accompagnées de l'aide technique médicale. Celle-ci esquisse la figure d'un homme amélioré par les biotechnologies, débarrassé des aléas des passions, maîtrisant ses colères et ses pulsions: un homme sans fièvre. Ainsi paradoxalement, à mesure (...) que la médecine identifie toujours plus de maladies, les hommes rèvent de parfaite guérison et en font à la fois une exigence personnelle et un idéal social. Guérir la société de ses blessures, nous défaire de notre vulnérabilité; telle est la manière dont est interprétée trop rapidement l'idée d'une société du soin proposée par de nouvelles philosophies. Pourtant, soigner n'est pas un geste anodin, guérir ne se fait pas sans souffrance et généraliser le modèle médical, c'est aussi prendre le risque de banaliser sa violence spécifique. (shrink)

In the context of abortion stigma, most abortion stories remain untold. The stories we do tell of abortion are often told to morally recuperate the status of the woman who has an abortion through a recourse to tragedy. Tragedy frames experiences where every choice produces some suffering, so decisions are geared toward maintaining individual integrity rather than adherence to absolute moral truths. This article argues that one dominant tragic abortion narrative, that of the disabled fetus, works to recuperate the moral (...) status of “fit” mothers while actively constructing disabled lives as unlivable and undesirable. The option to stigmatize disability in recuperating the moral status of the woman who has an abortion relies on eugenic logics that also construct a variety of women as illegitimate reproductive subjects. The article analyzes narratives of Sherri Finkbine's 1962 abortion in relation to contemporary narratives of late‐term abortions involving nonviable fetuses to expose how investment in medical judgments of good births enables particular women to make use of tragic narratives to maintain their status as moral mothers without disturbing broader abortion stigma or eugenic logics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Levinas—Between Philosophy and Rhetoric:The “Teaching” of Levinas’s Scriptural ReferencesClaire Elise KatzIn an interview titled "On Jewish Philosophy," Emmanuel Levinas illuminates the connection that he sees between philosophical discourse and the role of midrash in interpreting the Hebrew scriptures. His interviewer immediately expresses surprise at Levinas's comments that suggested he saw the traditions of philosophy and biblical theology as in some sense harmonious (quoted in Robbins 2001, 239). Levinas responds (...) by elaborating on this connection he sees. For him, the lived experience of Judaism is above all a sense of belonging to humanity and, in turn, to a supreme order of responsibility (240). Although his intellectual life focused on the sacred texts of Judaism, this life included non-Jewish books, which he believed expressed a similar concern or a similar responsibility—a concern for the meaning of life. This list of such books includes Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, The Miser, and The Misanthrope, in addition to the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky.In Levinas's view, these novels are not exercises of philosophyper se; as mentioned above, they express the same concerns that occupy philosophy, but they express these concerns in a different idiom. They do not offer a philosophical argument; instead, they use figurative language and literary narrative to convey their messages. By drawing this distinction between philosophy and literature, Levinas appears to have divided the written word into two categories: philosophy, on the one hand, and literary texts, on the other. Yet readers of his philosophical work cannot help but notice his frequent references to literary sources, including the numerous citations taken from the Jewish holy texts. His use of these citations encourages us to ask how we are to classify these books in general and how to classify, in particular, the Scriptures and the holy texts in Judaism. With regard to the holy texts in Judaism, should we classify them as simply a [End Page 159] literary device? Or, do they constitute a third category that falls somewhere in between philosophy and rhetoric? If the latter, then what is their status relative to these larger categories?Although Levinas insists on separating his two bodies of work—his philosophical writings and his Jewish writings—the distinction between them becomes increasingly blurred with his frequent introduction of citations from the Hebrew texts into his philosophy and by inflecting his Jewish writings with philosophical interpretations.1 In what follows, I examine the unique and significant role of Scriptural references within Levinas's philosophical work. My claim is that the Scriptural references are in fact rhetorical, but not "simply" rhetorical; they do pedagogical work for Levinas that other literary devices cannot accomplish. They engage his readers such that they are invited to grapple with the Scriptures in a manner potentially unfamiliar to them, and this invitation, in turn, has the pedagogical effect of attuning his readers to his texts and to his ethical project—even, one might say, to the other—and inviting them into an experience of transcendence.In the interview mentioned above, Levinas tells his interlocutor that for the Jews the Scriptures do not exist apart from the interpretations that accompany them. These interpretations are found in the collections of midrashim and the Talmud. One need know only a little bit about Hebrew and the construction of the Hebrew texts in order to see why these interpretations are significant. There are three grammatical concerns with the Hebrew language: first, biblical Hebrew does not contain vowels, though it does employ vowel aspirations; second, it is a language based on root letter combinations, and the meaning of these combinations alters, depending on the vowel aspirations that are inserted. For example, "Kiddish," the Hebrew blessing over wine, is based on a combination of Hebrew letters that are transliterated into English as KDSH. The blessing changes if we insert different vowel aspirations: "Kaddish" is the blessing said for those who have died. Third, biblical Hebrew lacks punctuation. Owing to the absence of vowels and punctuation, interpretation difficulties immediately emerge. The rabbinic model of midrash addresses these problems by offering multiple explanations and interpretations.Levinas, however, is not concerned with this aspect of the written language. Rather, he emphasizes... (shrink)

One of the most important aspects of Gilles Deleuzes philosophy is his criticism of the traditional concept of praxis. In Aristotelian philosophy praxis is properly oriented towards some end, and in the case of human action the ends of praxis are oriented towards the agents good life. Human goods are, for both Aristotle and contemporary neo-Aristotelians, determined by the potentials of human life such as rationality, communality, and speech. Deleuzes account of action, by contrast, liberates movement from an external end. (...) In his books on cinema Deleuze argues that we need to think of events in terms of their power, and not as movements within an already determined image of life. In order to think events as such we need to confront the power of the virtual. This is achieved by a philosophy of life in which becoming is not a means towards the realisation of some end. Rather, becomings are best seen as counter-actualisations: ways in which the already-constituted actual world always bears a power to become other than it already is. If we consider dance in this new context, then dance is neither expressive of an already existing life, nor a pure act that is self-sufficient and self-constituting. Rather, dance is a confrontation with life as a plane of open and divergent becomings. (shrink)

Au viie s., l’extension des territoires d’Argos et de Sparte dans le Péloponnèse était telle que le mont Parnon est devenu la zone de contact entre les deux cités : après l’annexion de la Thyréatide par Sparte, au vie s., l’époque classique continue à être ponctuée de conflits entre les deux cités, Argos cherchant à en reprendre le contrôle. Les auteurs anciens sont de peu de secours pour démêler l’écheveau de l’histoire politique de cette région, sise aux confins des territoires (...) argien, arcadien et spartiate, aux ve et ive s. : ils la mentionnent rarement, celle‑ci étant demeurée hors des grands conflits. Aussi, les sources archéologiques prennent‑elles toute leur importance. Cette contribution s’efforce de prolonger les enquêtes topographiques conduites par nos aînés en recourant à l’étude des fortifications, source de choix pour appréhender l’histoire régionale. Ainsi, l’étude des ouvrages fortifiés de Thyréatide (enceintes urbaines, tours isolées) permet d’éclairer l’histoire de cette région si convoitée ainsi que certains points de l’histoire du Péloponnèse à l’époque classique. De la période archaïque à l’époque hellénistique, la Thyréatide a été à la fois un ensemble cohérent et une partie des confins (eschatiai) d’un ensemble politique plus vaste, une région frontalière, aux marges du territoire lacédémonien ou argien, qui a conduit à l’implantation d’un réseau de villes fortifiés et de tours de guet. Après avoir fait l’inventaire de ces fortifications, leur analyse architecturale comme celle de leur implantation topographique nous ont souvent permis, d’abord d’y distinguer plusieurs phases de construction, ensuite de replacer ces ouvrages dans le réseau fortifié auquel ils appartiennent. Enfin, on a pu proposer parfois qui, de Sparte ou d’Argos, était le commanditaire de ces ouvrages fortifiés et vers quels ennemis ceux‑ci étaient tournés. Nous avons ainsi pu montrer que plusieurs de ceux qui étaient attribués à Sparte sont en fait à considérer plutôt comme argiens. (shrink)

Thomas Reid (1710-1796), comme on sait, réfute toute réduction des opérations mentales à la perception de quelque chose de mental (une image ou une idée par exemple). Ainsi il s’oppose au modèle perceptif des opérations mentales. Mais, pour sa part, comment pense-t-il les opérations mentales? Parce qu’il identifie la conception, que toute opération intellectuelle implique, à l’acte de concevoir, nous pouvons nous demander s’il pense que le pouvoir de l’esprit est celui d’un agent et si, selon lui, les opérations créent (...) l’évidence ou produisent leurs objets. Contre une telle interprétation, cet article établit dans un premier temps en quel sens les opérations mentales peuvent être considérées comme des actions de l’esprit. Dans un second temps, on examine le sens dans lequel elles sont dites avoir un objet. Ces deux points soulignent l’aversion de Reid pour le subjectivisme et expliquent son opposition au modèle perceptif. Le dernier temps de l’article distingue deux cibles : un modèle optique et un modèle tactile (d’où un modèle sentimentaliste fut dérivé). En prêtant attention à leurs motifs scientifiques et philosophiques, Reid se permet d’expliquer leur lien généalogique et de comprendre qu’ils ouvrent la voie à différentes sortes de scepticisme. (shrink)

En quoi les directives anticipées sont-elles normatives? En quoi ces écrits censés exprimer la volonté d’une personne à t1, devraient-ils être respectés par les soignants à t2? Pour répondre, nous analysons les directives anticipées pour la fin de vie comme un acte de langage. Nous proposons d’y voir une ascription, au sens où H. L. A Hart a forgé le concept d’ ascription de responsabilité et de droits. Il se pourrait qu’une telle analyse aide à sortir de l’ornière du dilemme (...) entre paternalisme et autonomisme, et à contourner les questions métaphysiques sur l’identité personnelle. À la lumière des thèses de Hart et de ses principales critiques, nous considérons l’ascription d’un droit du patient, l’ascription de sa volonté et l’ascription des responsabilités pour l’acte effectué par les soignants d’après les directives. (shrink)

Summary The correspondence in this issue of History of European Ideas has not previously been published. It is the surviving part of the epistolary exchange between Dugald Stewart and the Genevan professor and man of letters Pierre Prevost (1751?1839) from the 1790s to the 1820s. To this are added several closely connected letters to and from their associates. This correspondence is striking evidence of the republic of letters continuing to flourish in the aftermath of the French Revolution, illustrating the transmission (...) of works, the role of go-betweens, the provision of letters of introduction and the formation of intellectual and personal alliances. Not least, the letters tell us much about the ideas of those involved, and about the formation, development, and relation of these ideas to published works. This is particularly significant for Stewart, most of whose letters and papers are lost. (shrink)

La production désirante se trouve informée par le fait que le sujet affectif est inscrit dans une époque, une culture, un milieu social et tributaire de différentes formes de socialisation qui le disposent ou l’inclinent à désirer telle ou telle chose. Les trois théories que nous proposons de confronter font valoir l’origine principalement sociale des défenses suscitées par la vie pulsionnelle. Cette transformation affective est nommée par Freud refusement culturel ( Kulturversagung ), par Adorno et Horkheimer intégration totale ou répression (...) ( Repression ) et par Elias également répression et refoulement des pulsions ( Dämfung der Triebe ) mais au sens d’une capacité accrue d’autocontrôle ( Selbstkontrolle ) ou d’autocontrainte ( Selbstzwänge ). Qu’est-ce qui spécifie et distingue chacune de ces trois formes d’intégration de la norme sociale à la personne, pour reprendre une expression d’Elias dans La Société de cour? (shrink)

In Playtest, our thrill‐seeking protagonist Cooper tests SaitoGemu's “interactive augmented reality system.” As the fears he must face in “the most personal survival horror game in history” ramp up, Cooper begins to lose the ability to tell what's real and what isn't and decides he wants out, only to find that isn't so simple. But will virtual reality really be that scary? Perhaps no more than books, films and traditional video games, especially when the novelty wears off. Perhaps the real (...) moral of Playtest is “Call your mom”. But beneath the surface a much darker lesson lurks: that when our fantasies feel real, and have the power to hurt, they are no longer just a game. Virtual reality can build a bridge between what seems real and what is real, and this means its power to scare us silly is not just novel: it's revolutionary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Levinas—Between Philosophy and Rhetoric:The “Teaching” of Levinas’s Scriptural ReferencesClaire Elise KatzIn an interview titled "On Jewish Philosophy," Emmanuel Levinas illuminates the connection that he sees between philosophical discourse and the role of midrash in interpreting the Hebrew scriptures. His interviewer immediately expresses surprise at Levinas's comments that suggested he saw the traditions of philosophy and biblical theology as in some sense harmonious (quoted in Robbins 2001, 239). Levinas responds (...) by elaborating on this connection he sees. For him, the lived experience of Judaism is above all a sense of belonging to humanity and, in turn, to a supreme order of responsibility (240). Although his intellectual life focused on the sacred texts of Judaism, this life included non-Jewish books, which he believed expressed a similar concern or a similar responsibility—a concern for the meaning of life. This list of such books includes Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, The Miser, and The Misanthrope, in addition to the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky.In Levinas's view, these novels are not exercises of philosophyper se; as mentioned above, they express the same concerns that occupy philosophy, but they express these concerns in a different idiom. They do not offer a philosophical argument; instead, they use figurative language and literary narrative to convey their messages. By drawing this distinction between philosophy and literature, Levinas appears to have divided the written word into two categories: philosophy, on the one hand, and literary texts, on the other. Yet readers of his philosophical work cannot help but notice his frequent references to literary sources, including the numerous citations taken from the Jewish holy texts. His use of these citations encourages us to ask how we are to classify these books in general and how to classify, in particular, the Scriptures and the holy texts in Judaism. With regard to the holy texts in Judaism, should we classify them as simply a [End Page 159] literary device? Or, do they constitute a third category that falls somewhere in between philosophy and rhetoric? If the latter, then what is their status relative to these larger categories?Although Levinas insists on separating his two bodies of work—his philosophical writings and his Jewish writings—the distinction between them becomes increasingly blurred with his frequent introduction of citations from the Hebrew texts into his philosophy and by inflecting his Jewish writings with philosophical interpretations.1 In what follows, I examine the unique and significant role of Scriptural references within Levinas's philosophical work. My claim is that the Scriptural references are in fact rhetorical, but not "simply" rhetorical; they do pedagogical work for Levinas that other literary devices cannot accomplish. They engage his readers such that they are invited to grapple with the Scriptures in a manner potentially unfamiliar to them, and this invitation, in turn, has the pedagogical effect of attuning his readers to his texts and to his ethical project—even, one might say, to the other—and inviting them into an experience of transcendence.In the interview mentioned above, Levinas tells his interlocutor that for the Jews the Scriptures do not exist apart from the interpretations that accompany them. These interpretations are found in the collections of midrashim and the Talmud. One need know only a little bit about Hebrew and the construction of the Hebrew texts in order to see why these interpretations are significant. There are three grammatical concerns with the Hebrew language: first, biblical Hebrew does not contain vowels, though it does employ vowel aspirations; second, it is a language based on root letter combinations, and the meaning of these combinations alters, depending on the vowel aspirations that are inserted. For example, "Kiddish," the Hebrew blessing over wine, is based on a combination of Hebrew letters that are transliterated into English as KDSH. The blessing changes if we insert different vowel aspirations: "Kaddish" is the blessing said for those who have died. Third, biblical Hebrew lacks punctuation. Owing to the absence of vowels and punctuation, interpretation difficulties immediately emerge. The rabbinic model of midrash addresses these problems by offering multiple explanations and interpretations.Levinas, however, is not concerned with this aspect of the written language. Rather, he emphasizes... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German PhilosophyClaire Elise KatzPeter Eli Gordon. Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. xxix + 328. Cloth, $65.00.Peter Gordon's recent book brings together two seemingly disparate authors—Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. Gordon intends to demonstrate that although Franz Rosenzweig is most frequently viewed as a Jewish thinker, this perspective obfuscates his German background, which (...) Gordon argues plays an even more prominent role in his thinking. His claim is that Rosenzweig should be situated within his German background and within German thought in order to gain a broader and more accurate perspective of who he was and what his work means.The book is coherently organized with a substantial introduction that lays the groundwork for the rest of the argument. Here, Gordon introduces us to Rosenzweig, Heidegger, and modern German and Jewish thought. Subsequent discussions explore primary philosophical influences on Rosenzweig's thought, for example, the roots of Rosenzweig's "New Thinking" found in Hermann Cohen and the need for a critique of totality found in Hegel. The central chapters, which offer a re-reading of Rosenzweig's Star of Redemption, are clearly written and are alone worth the time of this book.In these two chapters, Gordon outlines the significance of Rosenzweig's thought as situated within the canon of western philosophy by demonstrating that Rosenzweig's work engages central questions and concerns within the history of philosophy. Primarily, Rosenzweig believes that western philosophy has concerned itself too much with death, the death of the individual and a need to transcend completely from this world. Rosenzweig, contra the history of western philosophy, argues for a philosophical position that emphasizes life here and now—the everyday—and, more importantly, that we remain in time and the world (179). And here he draws interesting comparisons to Heidegger, indicating that these philosophers had a similar relationship to the history of philosophy, both of which were influenced by the German milieu in which they wrote and thought.Gordon ends his study of the relationship between Rosenzweig and Heidegger by drawing our attention to Rosenzweig's last writings, which were in the form of newspaper articles. These writings attended to the Davos Disputation, the now infamous debate between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer. In these articles Rosenzweig indicates his partiality to Heidegger's position, in particular his position on redemption (285 ff.), indicating that Heidegger's philosophical stance represented most clearly Rosenzweig's New Thinking.Regardless of whether one agrees with Gordon's main thesis, this book is an original and significant contribution to philosophy and Jewish thought. Clearly Heidegger does not represent philosophy proper, since we still see grave signs of the split between analytic and "contemporary continental" philosophy; however, he does loom large as a central figure within European philosophy and specifically within German thought. To engage Rosenzweig's views with those of Heidegger brings Rosenzweig into a conversation from which he is normally excluded. And unfortuntately, when Rosenzweig is studied along with other figures such as Emmanuel Levinas, philosophers whose work is outside of Jewish thought will simply claim that Levinas is even more "Jewish" than they thought rather than admit that Rosenzweig is a philosophical thinker worthy of engagement. Although Gordon might hope that Rosenzweig scholars take more notice of the German background of Rosenzweig's thought, instead of circumscribing him within a strictly Jewish context, the engagement with Heidegger might be of more importance for Heidegger scholars and scholars of contemporary European philosophy.My sense is that Rosenzweig scholars in fact do notice the Germanic influence but also see the significance of treating Jewish philosophy as philosophy in its own right. It is "mainstream" philosophy that might need the reminder that Jewish philosophy is also philosophy. As a result, my primary concern is that Gordon's book might have de-emphasized the "Jewish" in order to make room for the "German." At the beginning of the book Gordon tells us that "Levinas was always suspicious of Heidegger." That, actually, is not true. Levinas attended the Davos debate and sided with Heidegger. But the events of the early 1930s led him... (shrink)

I develop a paradox regarding the emotional experiences of theatrical actors, which I call the ‘paradox of onstage emotion’. Many actors tell us that they experience genuine emotions while performing fictional plays: they grow angry, sad, joyful, etc., as befits their characters’ circumstances. Yet, they are not their characters and are not actually in those characters’ circumstances. Intuitively, it would seem those actors cannot have emotions befitting their characters’ circumstances rather than their own. Thus, we face a paradox. After setting (...) up the paradox, I consider potential solutions to it. I consider four different available solutions, two of which I argue must be rejected. The two remaining solutions, I argue, are more promising, though which of these one accepts may be determined by one’s commitments regarding emotion theory in general. One stems from make-believe theory, the other from situationism. (shrink)

Toute guerre se remporte avec des hommes et des munitions, y compris celle des idées. Aujourd'hui l'histoire, la politique, l'économie, la culture, le droit sont des champs de bataille. À nous d'y triompher de la pensée unique. Beaucoup ont déjà pris la plume, tels Jean Sévillia, Philippe de Villiers ou Mathieu Bock-Côté. Mais à cette aventure intellectuelle, le droit reste étranger. Chose curieuse, au regard de son immixtion dans nos vies, réglées comme des horloges suisses par ses rouages. Mal interprété, (...) il regorge d'idées fausses, parfois sciemment entretenues par nos législateurs à des fins politiques. Remettre le droit à l'endroit? C'est l'objet insolite de cet ouvrage. Les hommes naissent-ils réellement libres et égaux en droit? Nos élus nous coûtent-ils trop cher? La naissance d'un étranger en France le rend-elle nécessairement français? Le droit européen est-il vraiment supérieur au droit national? Trente questions pour y voir clair et combattre les idées reçues. (shrink)

1. Active passivité La surprise, en tant que telle, implique un « dehors », un événement dans notre relation au monde : elle n’est pas purement immanente à notre vie psychique. Il est impossible de se faire à soi-même une véritable surprise, il est bien difficile de simuler mentalement un effet de surprise. Plus transversal qu’un simple sentiment, le phénomène de la surprise peut solliciter l’ensemble de notre être, à commencer par notre institution corporelle la plus élémentaire. La surprise...

La philosophie de la nature appartient-elle au passé? Ou représente-t-elle aujourd’hui une exigence scientifique et métaphysique? Si l’on fait le pari du réalisme, si l’on pense que l’esprit humain est capable de démêler, entre ses constructions, celles qui représentent fidèlement les processus naturels de celles qui ne sont que cohérentes logiquement, alors il faut tenter d’esquisser, à la lumière des sciences, une vision rationnelle du monde. Telle est du moins la tâche que se propose la philosophie de la nature. Les (...) contributions ici réunies ont pour but d’éclairer l’histoire de ce problème, de suggérer en quoi consiste l’exploration des possibles naturels, et d’indiquer comment la cosmologie nous aide à penser notre appartenance à l’univers. (shrink)

In Caribbean literature, being gazed upon is often part of a larger design of imperial governance, conquest and appropriation, where surveillance is constant and omnipresent, particularly in texts that centre on life on the plantation or are set within the colonial house itself. In his first novel Witchbroom, Trinidadian writer Lawrence Scott presents a family saga through the eyes of the family’s last surviving member, Lavren, a hermaphrodite, trickster-narrator who travels through time to write down the record of his/herstory. To (...) tell his/her ‘Carnival Tales’, the narrator sets the scene in the houses of Kairi, in which the turret room features prominently. The room’s shape, location and the vantage point it offers to its privileged entrants allows them to have eyes on everything that goes on on the family estate and to record events accordingly. But the turret room also serves as a place of gendered confinement and seclusion replete with blind spots that the trickster-narrator–or, perhaps, the implied author?–will expose through his/her own supervisory gaze. As such, this contribution proposes to analyse the turret room as a complex and somewhat paradoxical site where scopic power serves at once to hide and reveal, and as a space that concomitantly functions as a ‘heterotopia of deviation’. By focusing on the carnivalesque, metafictional dimensions of the novel more particularly, the article will ultimately seek to examine iterations of authorial control and reader manipulation as literary reassessments of panopticism. (shrink)

Interwoven with natural structurations and personal history, the flesh , in Merleau-Ponty's gradually-forged conception, is nourished by the combined influences of neurology, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. This triple influence undergirds a recurring theme in his later writings: the mirror . "The flesh is a mirror phenomenon," Merleau-Ponty tells us. The unpublished manuscripts reveal that this famous clause refers neither directly to Husserl, nor to Wallon and Lacan, but is driven by contemporary readings of Paul Schilder and Wolfgang Metzger, who study (...) the phenomena of distanciated migrations of the body-image in vision. The mirror mingles objective body with phenomenal body, in an effective community between my lived body and its external image. It shows how the flesh lives both within and outside of itself, animated by an essential incompleteness that engages perception in a process of incorporation and, thus, hints at intercorporeity. (shrink)

Créée par Éric Rochant, Le Bureau des légendes (Canal +, 2015-2020) explore le monde du renseignement en décrivant le travail du service des agents clandestins de la DGSE. Face aux incertitudes et aux complexités géopolitiques du monde contemporain, elle fait le choix d’une immersion au cœur du « renseignement humain ». Cet article envisage l’hypothèse selon laquelle une telle fiction permet de restaurer la confiance des spectateurs vis-à-vis de la capacité d’une démocratie à lutter contre ce qui la menace. En (...) plongeant son spectateur dans les coulisses du renseignement, en le familiarisant avec des personnages complexes, la série questionne la légitimité de la confiance qu’il est possible d’accorder à un service de renseignement. La faillibilité des agents, mise en scène de façon détaillée, réfléchie par la série elle-même, rassure parce qu’elle permet de comprendre et de partager une forme de vie spécifique qui est celle de l’action secrète. L’espionnage, le contre-espionnage et le contre-terrorisme apparaissent alors comme des pratiques reposant en dernier ressort, non pas sur une maîtrise absolue, mais sur la décision de faire confiance ou au contraire de se méfier. Mobilisant les recherches de la sociologie contemporaine à propos de la confiance (Giddens, 1994 et Luhmann 2006), il s’agit de décrire Le Bureau des légendes comme une fiction projetant sur nos écrans, la possibilité d’une restauration de la confiance ou pour le dire à la manière de Stanley Cavell, une issue possible au scepticisme. (shrink)

The current pandemic and the measures taken to address it, on a global scale, are unprecedented. Times of crisis call for creative solutions, and these are not reduced to the work of scientists or politicians. In everyday life, both in online and offline spaces, people use their creativity to make sense of the current situation, to cope with it, and to learn its lessons. Social media is a privileged space for mundane and participative creativity through the production and sharing of (...) coronavirus Internet memes. In this article, we examine the creativity of such memes from a dedicated Reddit community. We ask, in particular, what makes a coronavirus meme creative and what this creativity tells us about the pandemic and popular understandings of it. To answer these questions, we use a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods by having 480 memes coded by three social media users for surprise, meaningfulness, elaboration, humor, and creativity and qualitatively analyzing those memes that score highly on each dimension. An interesting finding concerns the importance of elaboration and humor for the evaluation of creativity in the case of memes, above the more traditional criteria of surprise and meaningfulness, perhaps a feature unique for Internet spaces. The article ends with reflections on what these findings tell us about creativity on social media more generally and the creative processes involved in the generation and reception of coronavirus memes in particular. (shrink)

Aborder la violence telle qu’elle résonne en chacun dans son actualité singulière et proposer d’en faire « l’écho » collectivement, telle est l’invitation du dispositif en groupe de parole évoqué dans cet article. L’approche des auteurs définit la violence comme polysémique, polymorphe, continuelle, originaire, centrale et problématique. Chacun peut en faire l’expérience au cours de son existence dans divers champs, familial, professionnel, social, voire dans plusieurs, successivement ou simultanément, et selon des positions subjectives variables – auteurs, victimes ou témoins – (...) ou selon encore des configurations complexes. Deux cas cliniques éclairent en quoi le dispositif « groupe de parole » favorise le passage, « la passe », d’une violence engrammée par un sujet vers une métabolisation de ses effets. (shrink)

Aborder la violence telle qu’elle résonne en chacun dans son actualité singulière et proposer d’en faire « l’écho » collectivement, telle est l’invitation du dispositif en groupe de parole évoqué dans cet article. L’approche des auteurs définit la violence comme polysémique, polymorphe, continuelle, originaire, centrale et problématique. Chacun peut en faire l’expérience au cours de son existence dans divers champs, familial, professionnel, social, voire dans plusieurs, successivement ou simultanément, et selon des positions subjectives variables – auteurs, victimes ou témoins – (...) ou selon encore des configurations complexes. Deux cas cliniques éclairent en quoi le dispositif « groupe de parole » favorise le passage, « la passe », d’une violence engrammée par un sujet vers une métabolisation de ses effets. (shrink)

After reading Barbara William’s picture book Albert’s Impossible Toothache, Jana Mohr Lone’s fourth grade students at Whittier Elementary School in Seattle discussed the relationship between telling a lie, telling the truth, and making a mistake, and how we know that we are talking about the same thing when we talk with someone. The discussion led to an exploration of why the things children say are often less likely to be believed than what adults say. This section contains six fourth grade (...) students’ responses to the question: “Are children more or less trustworthy than adults?” These answers, the question they are responding to, and the book which inspired the discussion, all offer possibilities for further discussion. (shrink)

After reading Barbara William’s picture book Albert’s Impossible Toothache, Jana Mohr Lone’s fourth grade students at Whittier Elementary School in Seattle discussed the relationship between telling a lie, telling the truth, and making a mistake, and how we know that we are talking about the same thing when we talk with someone. The discussion led to an exploration of why the things children say are often less likely to be believed than what adults say. This section contains six fourth grade (...) students’ responses to the question: “Are children more or less trustworthy than adults?” These answers, the question they are responding to, and the book which inspired the discussion, all offer possibilities for further discussion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS353 Sainte Claire en Rouergue: viii centenaire de sainte Claire. Conférences du Colloque de Millau (29 septembre-3 octobre 1993). Ed. "Les amis de sainte Claire aujourd'hui." Millau: Maury, 1994. 220 pp. During the eighth centenary of the birth of St. Clare, many symposiums were planned in France: Millau, Béziers, Montpellier, Perpignan and Paris. Sainte Claire en Rouergue presents most of the conferences from the symposium of Millau, September (...) 29 to October 3, 1993. This symposium celebrated the Franciscan presence in the region of Rouergue, France, during the last eight hundred years as well as the history and spirituality of St. Clare. Although the presentations were focused on a clearer history of the Poor Clares, they provided much information about the First Order as well as the Third Order Franciscan women of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The book presented a clear overview of the Franciscan foundations, devastations, and their re-establishment after the French Revolution and the disappearance of many communities. The first section highlighted the person of Saint Clare and her historical moment. The various articles provided an interesting review of many different dimensions: of Ladies in history in the 11th to the 13th century (Pernoud), the new religious structure begun by Clare (Dejour), her spirituality (Fabre) and the living of the Gospel by Francis and Clare (Dutheil). The direction of the symposium was not only to the past glories of Clare, but examined her place in social communication today (Gritti) and gave practical suggestions so as to concretize her spirituality and her influence in the future of Franciscan life (Miniou, Mercadier, Ghirard). The second section of the book focused on the history of the Franciscan presence in southwestern France. Information was gathered from many sources about the various branches of Franciscan life in Rouergue: Friars Minor, Coletans, Capuchins, Recollects, Cordeliers, Cordelières, Damianites, Minorettes, and Urbanists. The symposium presented different backgrounds and aspects of Franciscan life in Rouergue using archives, iconography, descriptions of artifacts and images, charts and maps. A more detailed 354BOOK REVIEWS description of these various communities was given through the use of obituaries, personal and communal histories, photographs, and listing of dowries. The three Poor Clare communities of Rouergue were: Millau (founded in 1291); Granayrac-(1326-1677) moved to Villefranche-deRouergue (1677-1792); and Mur-de-Barrez (founded in 1653). Villefranche began as a rural contemplative monastery, but later moved to the city where they taught young girls and allowed elderly women to live with them. Through the stormy history of the Calvinist revolt and the French Revolution, the Poor Clare communities were dispersed more than once, but they are re-established in Millau and Mur-deBarrez today. Besides the political struggles, the Poor Clares of Millau had a long history of religious controversy and intrigue as well as glory. Presentations are also given on the Annunciationists, another branch of the Poor Clares founded by Jeanne of France and the Franciscan, Gabriel-Maria. These women came to Rodez in 1519. Third Order religious congregations were the first to return to Rouergue after the dispersion of the French Revolution. Saint Claire en Rouergue, well researched, adds another helpful fragment to the multi-faceted history of the followers of Francis and Clare. Monasîère Ste.ClaireSR. PACELLI MILLANE, O.S.C. Valleyfield, Quebec Antoine Faivre. Access To Western Esotericism. Binghamton: State University of New York Press, 1994.? + 369 pp. $19.95. "These two volumes of unequal length, originally published in French" (p. x), provide the reader with a rich (if often haphazard) analysis of a difficult, complex subject. Even the term "esotericism" is difficult to define, and is often confused or identified with occultism. Faivre wisely restricts his study to western esotericism, whose focus, he argues, is "essentially on the... (shrink)

Saul Goodman, Slipping Jimmy, Charlie Hustle, Gene Takavic, Viktor Saint Claire, and many others — all seem to be aliases of one James McGill. The characterization question, from the point of view of the metaphysics of identity, is trying to answer what determines personal identity. The notion of persistence describes necessary and sufficient conditions for a person to continue or cease to exist as a person. The practical importance of persistence includes both responsibility for a person's actions and the (...) fact that identity matters practically because of a person's selfish care about his or her own future. From a Better Call Saul perspective, we are combining metaphysical issues of identity — that pinpoint what it takes for someone to remain the same person — with the pendulum of various James McGill personae. -/- James McGill does seem to have both biological and psychological continuity while shifting from one character to another, but we will argue that psychological continuity is only relevant at the lowest level and that the narrativist account seems to better explain different Jimmy personae. Narrativism answers the persistence question by stating that we are persisting as the same person because of the stories we tell about ourselves, which influence our lives and our decisions. Identity is being constituted at a narrative level, that is — Jimmy is his (current) story, determining when he begins and ends. In this paper, by analyzing character development throughout the series, we are trying to show that James McGill may not always be equated with his aliases because of different spatial and temporal narratives, which also could open various ethical implications of responsibility for past actions. (shrink)

La « Gender History » a suscité nombre de travaux sur la place des femmes dans l’histoire. Ce sont encore les femmes qui sont ici considérées autour de la question : « peut-on être sainte, reine et femme durant le Haut Moyen Âge? » Quand, où, pourquoi et sous quelles formes l’idéal de la sainte reine se construit-il? Pour y répondre, l’auteur se fonde sur une vingtaine de vies de saintes franques, anglo-saxonnes et germaniques. L’ouvrage débute par une présentation des (...) saintes reines et du... (shrink)

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, best known for his 'Project for Perpetual Peace', in fact left a much larger and more coherent body of political and moral writing, but it has been only partially studied. This book, the first systematic exploration of his entire corpus, offers a complete re-evaluation of this important author's contributions to the Enlightenment. From the first decades of the eighteenth century, Saint-Pierre set forth a pioneering vision of politics as the harmonisation of interests, anticipating Bentham (...) as a utilitarian. He imagines replacing the system of inherited power and clientele networks, which structured Old Regime society and determined the exercise of power under absolutism, with a rationalised, meritocratic and dynamic organisation. He argued for the political values of social utility and public good to take the place of the Christian ideals of perfection and the aristocratic ideals of personal charisma. As a deist seeking to reconcile morality and religion, Saint-Pierre argued that the search for salvation through active piety must also promote social justice and beneficence--and that only the indivisible power of a rationalised monarch, informed by competent elites, could carry out the reforms necessary to yield a government which would produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Saint-Pierre, thus, provided among the first arguments for an imposed welfare state, well before the sources more frequently associated with that idea--political economists, cameralists and the physiocrats."--Pages v-vi. (shrink)

Ten years after her death, Princess Diana still has star power. The media are filled with tributes and retrospectives, and all over the world, the public seems to be avidly soaking it up. Has Diana become a new kind of saint, and if so, what does that tell us?

In recent decades, a new scientific approach to understand, explain, and predict many features of religion has emerged. The cognitive science of religion has amassed research on the forces that shape the tendency for humans to be religious and on what forms belief takes. It suggests that religion, like language or music, naturally emerges in humans with tractable similarities. This new approach has profound implications for how we understand religion, including why it appears so easily, and why people are willing (...) to fight-and die for it. Yet it is not without its critics, and some fear that scholars are explaining the ineffable mystery of religion away, or by showing that religion is natural proves or disproves the existence of God. An Introduction to the Cognitive Science of Religion offers students and general readers an accessible introduction to the approach, providing an overview of key findings and the debates that shape it. The volume includes a glossary of key terms, and each chapter includes suggestions for further thought and further reading as well as chapter summaries highlighting key points. This book is an indispensable resource for introductory courses on religion and a much-needed option for advanced courses. (shrink)

When one of this journal’s editors asked me to edit an issue and told me I would select the topic, the idea of dedicating papers to the question of individuals immediately came to mind. Pragmatism has such a social orientation in the current literature that it seems that individuals get left behind. But the question of the nature of individuals, and especially how much of the good life should be left to individual contemplation, has occupied pragmatists at least since Emerson. (...) I have selected and arranged the contributions so that, to me, they speak to each other. And I see no need to offer a traditional preface to the volume in which I tell readers what the authors will tell them in their own words better than I. Instead I offer my own thoughts on the nature of exemplary individuals and on why the question is important in contrasting Dewey and James on religious experience and questions of metaphysics. And although I do not spend any real time in the essay on Emerson and Thoreau, I would align them more with James than Dewey. I tried hard not to use the word ‘community’ in my essay. Why focus on James? Personally I have always wanted to write something dealing with the Varieties of Religious Experience. It was suggested to me by my favorite undergraduate teacher Robert O’Connell in 1969 and I got around to reading it in 1990. It’s an especially odd book, the most personal writing of an author inclined to honest expression. Even James expressed embarrassment at the amount of emotion it contained. Once again, thanks to the editors for allowing me to select and arrange these papers. And thanks to the contributors for allowing me to work with them. (shrink)

L'homme occidental est "augustinien" sans le savoir. Et l'homme du XXe siècle tout autant, car loin de se limiter à l'Antiquité et à l'Eglise, la pensée d'Augustin a irrigué la pensée contemporaine. Voici pour la première fois une présentation extrêmement claire des apports de la pensée d'Augustin à la philosophie européenne du XXe siècle. Augustin fut de tous les grands débats philosophiques et culturels de ce siècle, au coeur des discussions philosophiques sur l'évolutionnisme, notre rapport à la culture antique, les (...) recherches sur le temps, la personne... Jean-François Petit présente chacun des grands moments "augustiniens" de ce siècle, et les interprétations de son oeuvre en jeu, le renouvellement de la lecture de sa pensée. On peut ainsi découvrir les apports de Blondel, Heidegger, Camus, Gadamer, Jaspers, H. Arendt, Emmanuel Mounier, Etty Hillesum, Derrida, Marion, Lyotard... Comme l'écrit Jean-François Petit : "La philosophie augustinienne a aidé des penseurs du XXe siècle à faire surgir la vérité de leur propre philosophie.". (shrink)

By the mid-1930s, Emil Cioran was already known as a leader of a new generation of politically committed Romanian intellectuals. Researching another, more radical book, Cioran was spending hours in a library poring over the lives of saints. As a modern hagiographer, Cioran "dreamt" himself "the chronicler of these saints' falls between heaven and earth, the intimate knower of the ardors in their hearts, the historian of God's insomniacs." Inspired by Nietzsche's _Beyond Good and Evil_, Cioran "searched for the origin (...) of tears." He asked himself if saints could be "the sources of tears' better light." "Who can tell?" he wrote in the first paragraph of this book, first published in Romania in 1937. "To be sure, tears are their trace. Tears did not enter the world through the saints; but without them we would never have known that we cry because we long for a lost paradise." By following in their traces, "wetting the soles of one's feet in their tears," Cioran hoped to understand how a human being can renounce being human. Written in Cioran's characteristic aphoristic style, this flamboyant, bold, and provocative book is one of his most important—and revelatory—works. Cioran focuses not on martyrs or heroes but on the mystics—primarily female—famous for their keening spirituality and intimate knowledge of God. Their Christianity was anti-theological, anti-institutional, and based solely on intuition and sentiment. Many, such as Catherine of Siena, Teresa of Avila, and Saint John of the Cross, have produced classic works of mystical literature; but Cioran celebrates many more minor and unusual figures as well. Following Nietzsche, he focuses explicitly on the political element hidden in saints' lives. In his hands, however, their charitable deeds are much less interesting than their thirst for pain and their equally powerful capacity to endure it. Behind their suffering and their uncanny ability to renounce everything through ascetic practices, Cioran detects a fanatical will to power. "Like Nietzsche, Cioran is an important religious thinker. His book intertwines God and music with passion and tears.... [_Tears and Saints_] has a chillingly contemporary ring that makes this translation important here and now."—_Booklist_. (shrink)

By the mid-1930s, Emil Cioran was already known as a leader of a new generation of politically committed Romanian intellectuals. Researching another, more radical book, Cioran was spending hours in a library poring over the lives of saints. As a modern hagiographer, Cioran "dreamt" himself "the chronicler of these saints' falls between heaven and earth, the intimate knower of the ardors in their hearts, the historian of God's insomniacs." Inspired by Nietzsche's _Beyond Good and Evil_, Cioran "searched for the origin (...) of tears." He asked himself if saints could be "the sources of tears' better light." "Who can tell?" he wrote in the first paragraph of this book, first published in Romania in 1937. "To be sure, tears are their trace. Tears did not enter the world through the saints; but without them we would never have known that we cry because we long for a lost paradise." By following in their traces, "wetting the soles of one's feet in their tears," Cioran hoped to understand how a human being can renounce being human. Written in Cioran's characteristic aphoristic style, this flamboyant, bold, and provocative book is one of his most important—and revelatory—works. Cioran focuses not on martyrs or heroes but on the mystics—primarily female—famous for their keening spirituality and intimate knowledge of God. Their Christianity was anti-theological, anti-institutional, and based solely on intuition and sentiment. Many, such as Catherine of Siena, Teresa of Avila, and Saint John of the Cross, have produced classic works of mystical literature; but Cioran celebrates many more minor and unusual figures as well. Following Nietzsche, he focuses explicitly on the political element hidden in saints' lives. In his hands, however, their charitable deeds are much less interesting than their thirst for pain and their equally powerful capacity to endure it. Behind their suffering and their uncanny ability to renounce everything through ascetic practices, Cioran detects a fanatical will to power. "Like Nietzsche, Cioran is an important religious thinker. His book intertwines God and music with passion and tears.... [_Tears and Saints_] has a chillingly contemporary ring that makes this translation important here and now."—_Booklist_. (shrink)

Nombreuse, infiniment ondoyante et diverse, cette pensee n'est qu'une charite toujours active dont le mouvement incessant tend vers des objets qui nous echappent ou vers les aspects inconnus de ceux que nous percevions deja. Comment suivre une telle pensee sans etre cette pensee meme (...)?. Le present ouvrage tente une reponse en meme temps qu'il pose la question. Considerant que les ecrits de Bonaventure dessinent moins une progression lineaire qu'ils ne suivent un ordre du coeur, Etienne Gilson propose ici, apres (...) un chapitre introductif de nature biographique qui cherche l'homme derriere l'oeuvre, un parcours circulaire autour du centre de la synthese bonaventurienne, le Verbe, incarne en la personne du Christ. C'est ainsi que se trouvent abordes les themes fondamentaux que sont la critique de la philosophie naturelle, l'evidence de l'existence de Dieu et le probleme de la science et de la volonte divines, mais aussi la creation, les corps inanimes, les animaux, l'ame humaine, les anges, ou encore l'illumination, la grace et la beatitude. Ces etudes convergent et culminent tout a la fois dans un dernier chapitre qui s'attache a saisir l'esprit de ce penseur. A l'encontre de l'argument qui consiste a qualifier Bonaventure de mystique pour le releguer hors de l'histoire de la philosophie, Etienne Gilson se propose de recourir precisement a cet argument pour l'y reintegrer: le sentiment mystique, penetrant en effet toutes les couches de l'edifice, est ce qui lui confere sa systematicite, et une systematicite telle que cette mystique speculative bonaventurienne partage seule avec la doctrine thomiste le titre de synthese de la pensee scolastique tout entiere. Tendant toujours vers une metaphysique de la mystique chretienne comme vers son terme ultime, cette pensee temoigne simultanement de la necessite de la science et de sa subordination aux ravissements mystiques, et se situe a la rencontre des influences de saint Francois, de saint Augustin et des exigences systematiques des Sommes de Thomas d'Aquin. L'oeuvre de Bonaventure marque ainsi un moment capital dans le long progres par lequel la theologie scolastique parvint a l'unite d'un systeme. (shrink)

Medieval theologians may not have agonized over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin—though the question does arise in the anonymous mystical dialogue Schwester Katrei—but on other matters angels provoked them to endless speculation. How many are there? Perhaps 34,720,000,000, but that was not the only calculation. Without bodies, how do they speak or sing? Do they have names, or even personal identities? How and why and when did some of them rebel? How do they flit (...) back and forth between praising God in heaven and tending to people on earth? The Bible says much about angels, but they remain abstract and good to speculate about. They are ranked in a hierarchy of orders, but the theologians have different ways of organizing them. James Collins used to say that angels, rational beings like us, show what we would be without our bodies. Even disembodied, however, we would be less mysterious to ourselves than angels are. Saints, being less abstract than angels, lend themselves far more to storytelling—which is precisely what Weinberger does when he shifts from angels to saints. Having guided the reader through issue after speculative issue in the field of angelology, he tells story after story from the treasure trove of hagiography. Are there no issues to be explored? Might the reader be interested in the tug-of-war between action and contemplation, or the role of conversion and penitence, or the gender dynamics of sainthood, or for that matter the tendency of saints to wrestle with demons, bidden or unbidden? Saints are paradoxically both imitable and utterly beyond imitation: they feed the hungry, but they also (some of them) levitate, or starve themselves to death, or produce fire from their fingertips. Unlike angels, they are firmly grounded in history, which means they change over time: modern saints differ from ancient ones, at least in context. Weinberger gives ample material for reflection about saints—at one point, a catalog of ten Hyacinths and a Hyacintha. In approaching the angels, he gives questions with multiple answers; in dealing with saints, he gives answers and leaves it for us to ask the right questions. (shrink)

" He asked himself if saints could be "the sources of tears' better light." "Who can tell?" he wrote in the first paragraph of this book, first published in Romania in 1937. "To be sure, tears are their trace.